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Securities and Exchange Commission’s voting record on legal actions

Since tomorrow is election day in America I thought it would be appropriate to talk about the Securities and Exchange Commission’s voting record with respect to legal actions.

As a background, there are five Commissioners who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.  Terms of these Commissioners last five years and are staggered so that one Commissioner’s term ends on June 5 of each year.  The Chair and Commissioners may continue to serve approximately 18 months after terms expire if they are not replaced before then.  What’s interesting is that to ensure the Commission remains non-partisan, no more than three Commissioners may belong to the same political party.  The President also designates one of the Commissioners as Chair.  As of the time of this blog post there are three Commissioners, Mary Jo White, Chair, Kara M. Stein, and Michael S. Piwowar.  Two vacancies currently exist on the Commission.

The Division of Enforcement, whose activities are overseen by the Commission, has had a milestone year in terms of both enforcement actions and whistleblower awards.  Before the SEC staff brings enforcement actions the Commission must vote and approve the staff to take action.  To provide insight into this process the SEC posts voting results of the Commission on its website.

In analyzing these voting results following are some interesting trends:

  • Since January 2016, the Commission voted on 804 proceedings
  • Between January 1, 2016 and the date of today’s post, the Commissioners have nearly a 98% “Approved” voting record on these proceedings
  • In only 20 of the 804 proceedings did any Commissioner vote “Not Approved”
  • In every proceeding when a “Not Approved” vote was cast, a majority of the Commission voted “Approved”
  • In only 20 of the 804 proceedings did a Commissioner vote “Approved with Exception” (reasons for the exception included the amount of corporate penalty or the bar sanctions, for example)
  • When a Commissioner voted “Not Approved,” it was generally Commissioner Piwowar

With this in mind, there are multiple ways of thinking about potential explanations for the high rate of conformity in voting, such as large caseload juxtaposed against a lack of sufficient time to truly vet cases to bring or political pressure to increase actions.  Although interested parties may make different conclusions about these findings, they are, nonetheless, important to take note of.

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Improving the statement of cash flows financial reporting standards

In August 2016 the FASB issued ASU 2016-15, Statement of Cash Flows (Topic 230): Classification of Certain Cash Receipts and Cash Payments (a consensus of the Emerging Issues Task Force), which goes into effect for public business entities whose fiscal years begin after December 15, 2017.  The goal of ASU 2016-15 is to reduce diversity in practice in how certain cash receipts and cash payments are presented and classified in the statement of cash flows under Topic 230, Statement of Cash Flows, and other Topics.

With this goal in mind, this ASU addresses eight specific statement of cash flows (SCF) classification issues.  They include:

  1. Debt Prepayment or Debt Extinguishment Costs – Cash payments for debt prepayment or debt extinguishment costs should be classified as cash outflows for financing activities.
  2. Settlement of Zero-Coupon Debt Instruments or Other Debt Instruments with Coupon Interest Rates That Are Insignificant in Relation to the Effective Interest Rate of the Borrowing – At the settlement of zero-coupon debt instruments or other debt instruments with coupon interest rates that are insignificant in relation to the effective interest rate of the borrowing, the issuer should classify the portion of the cash payment attributable to the accreted interest related to the debt discount as cash outflows for operating activities, and the portion of the cash payment attributable to the principal as cash outflows for financing activities.
  3. Contingent Consideration Payments Made after a Business Combination – Cash payments not made soon after the acquisition date of a business combination by an acquirer to settle a contingent consideration liability should be separated and classified as cash outflows for financing activities and operating activities.  Cash payments up to the amount of the contingent consideration liability recognized at the acquisition date (including measurement-period adjustments) should be classified as financing activities; any excess should be classified as operating activities.  Cash payments made soon after the acquisition date of a business combination by an acquirer to settle a contingent consideration liability should be classified as cash outflows for investing activities.
  4. Proceeds from the Settlement of Insurance Claims – Cash proceeds received from the settlement of insurance claims should be classified on the basis of the related insurance coverage (that is, the nature of the loss).  For insurance proceeds that are received in a lumpsum settlement, an entity should determine the classification on the basis of the nature of each loss included in the settlement.
  5. Proceeds from the Settlement of Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Policies, including Bank-Owned Life Insurance Policies – Cash proceeds received from the settlement of corporate-owned life insurance policies should be classified as cash inflows from investing activities.  The cash payments for premiums on corporate-owned policies may be classified as cash outflows for investing activities, operating activities, or a combination of investing and operating activities.
  6. Distributions Received from Equity Method Investees – When a reporting entity applies the equity method, it should make an accounting policy election to classify distributions received from equity method investees using one of two approaches: (1) cumulative earnings approach or (2) nature of the distribution approach.  These two approaches are further described within this ASU.  Disclosures related to changes in accounting principle may be required depending on an entity’s elections.
  7. Beneficial Interests in Securitization Transactions – A transferor’s beneficial interest obtained in a securitization of financial assets should be disclosed as a non-cash activity, and cash receipts from payments on a transferor’s beneficial interests in securitized trade receivables should be classified as cash inflows from investing activities.
  8. Separately Identifiable Cash Flows and Application of the Predominance Principle – The classification of cash receipts and payments that have aspects of more than one class of cash flows should be determined first by applying specific guidance in GAAP.  In the absence of specific guidance, an entity should determine each separately identifiable source or use within the cash receipts and cash payments on the basis of the nature of the underlying cash flows.  An entity should then classify each separately identifiable source or use within the cash receipts and payments on the basis of their nature in financing, investing, or operating activities.  In situations in which cash receipts and payments have aspects of more than one class of cash flows and cannot be separated by source or use, the appropriate classification should depend on the activity that is likely to be the predominant source or use of cash flows for the item.

Current GAAP is either unclear or does not include specific guidance on these eight SCF classification issues included in the amendments in this ASU.  With this in mind, the ASU is an improvement to GAAP because it provides guidance for each of these eight issues, thereby reducing the current and potential future diversity in practice.

Errors in the statement of cash flows

An interesting data point in the context of the SCF is that in the last five years the second most common issue cited in financial statement restatements related to errors in the SCF.  The following chart depicts SCF errors compared to six other common restatement issues between 2001 and 2015:

scf-restatements

As one can gather, these eight SCF classification issues may be perceived as addressing non-routine transactions.  According to the Audit Analytics August 2016 report on SOX 404 Disclosures, which I wrote about in a previous post, in 2015 approximately 5% of auditor attestations cited ineffective internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) due, at least in part, to SCF classification issues.  Although this is a relatively small percentage compared to the total number of ICFR failures in 2015, these SCF classification issues typically related to non-routine transactions.

With the new guidance in ASU 2016-15, we can expect improvements in the disclosures related to the SCF; however, it’s unclear at this juncture what extent of influence the adoption of the ASU will have on mitigating ICFR failures going forward.

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Responding to accounting restatement risk

A fundamental tenet of financial reporting is that a company’s internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) are sufficiently robust to ensure transactions are properly recognized and disclosed in its financial statements.  The appropriateness of financial statements hinges on the fair presentation in conformity with GAAP.  Furthermore, the concept of materiality is the deciding factor of what is “fair” and what is not.

However, at times companies misstate their financial statements.  In some situations these misstatements are simple, unintentional errors; whereas, in other cases they may be intentional.  When misstatements occur, companies must determine whether or not these misstatements result in materially misleading financial statements.  For purposes of clarity, an error is defined in ASC 250, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections as “[a]n error in recognition, measurement, presentation, or disclosure in financial statements resulting from mathematical mistakes, mistakes in the application of [GAAP], or oversight or misuse of facts that existed at the time the financial statements were prepared.”

Because identified misstatements that relate to the current period can be addressed by management without any required restatements, today’s post will address certain risk areas and requirements that companies will want to address in assessing misstatements in prior periods.

Materiality

In a previous post I wrote about materiality considerations, which should be considered in assessing whether or not the prior period financial statements are materially misstated.  Indeed, it is well established that calculating a quantitative threshold of materiality is an important step in a materiality assessment (such as 5-10% of pre-tax income).  However, companies should give consideration to qualitative factors as well.  The SEC’s staff issued SAB No. 99 to provide some guidance to considering qualitative factors.  Notwithstanding its guidance, SAB No. 99 does not address what might be considered not material.

Types of restatement

Depending on the outcome of a materiality assessment, companies may find themselves in one of two categories:

  1. Reissuance restatement – referred to as “Big R” restatement because this means the previously issued financial statements were materially incorrect and, therefore, are unreliable and must be reissued/restated.  In these cases, the prior period financial statements must be amended.
  2. Revision restatement – referred to as “Little r” restatement because, although there are errors in the previously issued financial statements, they were not material to the prior periods.  A company may choose to either make the error correction in the current period or it may recast its prior period financial results in connection with issuing its current period financial statements.  When a company elects to recast its prior period financial statements in connection with issuing its current period financial statements, it revises its financial statements.  In these circumstances, the prior period financial statements do not need to be amended.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act certification requirements

In the context of restatements, SEC registrants must be aware of risk exposure related to Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) certification requirements.  As a refresher, as early as 2004 SEC registrants were required to implement certain provisions of SOX.  These provisions address requirements that the principal executive officer or officers (CEO or equivalent) and the principal financial officer or officers (CFO or equivalent) must certify.  The first requirement, Section 302, is found in SOX’s Title III – Corporate Responsibility.  The second requirement, Section 906, is found in SOX’s Title IX – White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements.

  • SOX Section 302 – In connection with filing of periodic financial reports with the SEC, the CEO and CFO (as signing officers) are required to certify in each quarterly and annual report:
    • the signing officer has reviewed the report;
    • based on the signing officer’s knowledge, the report doesn’t contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading;
    • based on the signing officer’s knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in the report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report;
    • the signing officers:
      • are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls
      • have designed such internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such officers by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which the periodic reports are being prepared;
      • have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report; and
      • have presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal controls based on their evaluation as of that date;
    • the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of the board of directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent function):
      • all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial data and have identified for the issuer’s auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and
      • any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the issuer’s internal controls; and
    • the signing officers have indicated in the report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of their evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
  • SOX Section 906 – In connection with filing of periodic financial reports with the SEC, the CEO and CFO (as signing officers) are required to certify in each quarterly and annual report:
    • the periodic financial report containing the financial statements fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.

Section 906 provides for criminal penalties if the CEO and/or CFO:

  • certifies any statement within Section 906 knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with all the requirements set forth in Section 906 shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or
  • willfully certifies any statement as set forth in Section 906 knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with all the requirements set forth in Section 906 shall be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

In light of these certification requirements and the potential criminal penalties, signing officers must be confident that their financial reporting controls are reliable.  With this in mind, when Big R restatement risk is heightened, companies should be cognizant of the regulatory and legal exposure associated with potential non-compliance.

Furthermore, when it comes to material misstatements in the company’s prior period financial statements, there is a rebuttable presumption that a material weakness in ICFR exists.  Another thing to keep in mind is that even though a Little r restatement may end up being the correct solution to addressing misstatements, the SEC registrant may end up concluding that a material weakness still exists in ICFR.  This gets at the concept of the “could” factor in assessing deficiencies in ICFR, which I previously wrote about.

Tips for companies

I recently listened to a webcast discussing 10 pitfalls to avoid when navigating a Big R restatement (replay link).  For convenience, I’ve listed these 10 pitfalls:

  1. Engaging inexperienced counsel and advisors for the investigation
  2. Forming a special committee when the audit committee might suffice
  3. The run-away or open-ended investigation
  4. Failing to keep auditors apprised of the investigation and errors found
  5. Indecisiveness and inability to reach conclusions
  6. Waiting too long to deal with wrongdoers
  7. Not self-reporting findings to the SEC
  8. Audit committee micromanagement of the restatement
  9. Failing to remediate
  10. Creating an unnecessarily detailed SAB 99 materiality analysis

In addition to these tips, companies should ensure they follow the standards governing accounting restatements in ASC 250 and that they assess misstatements for each reporting period.  Although certain misstatements may be insignificant in any given reporting period, they could aggregate to a material amount over time (such as the impact to the balance sheet).

When restatements arise, SEC registrants will need to disclose relevant information on SEC Forms 10-K/A and 8-K (for Big R) and SEC Form 10-K (for Little r).

Influencing the narrative

I’m going to fast forward the process of restating financial statements to communicating with outsiders what the facts are.  When management becomes aware of material misstatements in prior periods, the company should be clear and assertive with users of its financial statements about the nature and extent of the misstatements identified.  In connection with its assessment, management should be able to, at a minimum, address the following concerns:

  • explain the magnitude of the misstatement;
  • identify which accounts were affected;
  • describe what was done to remediate the misstatement (both in the financial statements and in ICFR);
  • explain what programs and controls have been put in place to avoid misstatements from occurring in the future; and
  • explain the implications of misstatements on the company’s future financial reporting and forecasts

It goes without saying that if companies do not take active measures to effectively management the risks I’ve discussed, users of their financial statements may call into question whether or not the root-causes in the company have been addressed.

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A Look-back: 12 years of SOX Section 404

Many companies became subject to the provisions of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) beginning for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004.  Specifically, Section 404(a) requires public companies’ annual reports to include the company’s own assessment of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR).  Section 404(b) requires an independent auditor’s report on the effectiveness of the company’s ICFR.

Since the implementation of SOX 12 years ago, we have seen some interesting trends in financial restatement statistics and SEC enforcement trends, which I have written about recently (here and here).  In fact, a recent Audit Analytics report has highlighted some key take-aways related to Section 404 disclosures.

Effectiveness of ICFR requiring auditor attestation

SOX Section 404(b) states that accelerated filers (including large accelerated filers) must provide an independent auditor’s report on the effectiveness of the filer’s ICFR.  The following chart shows adverse auditor reports as a percentage of total auditor reports on ICFR on an annual basis within the last 12 years.

% Adverse Auditor Attestations

For clarification, according to PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS 5), An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements, an adverse opinion signifies that at least one material weakness exists within a company’s ICFR.

Naturally, one would expect the first year of implementation, 2004, to yield the least favorable results.  To also note is that because the SOX Section 404 requirements went into effect in late 2004, only a portion of companies whose fiscal years ended in 2004 were required to implement these requirements (i.e., those whose fiscal years ended on or after November 15, 2004).  This means that a smaller number of companies filed auditor attestations related to fiscal 2004 when compared to fiscal 2005.

What I find interesting about the above chart, and the Audit Analytics report discusses, is the historical “low” in the rate in 2010.  In 2010, the PCAOB inspection program began determining if audit firms had obtained adequate evidence to substantiate the auditor’s attestation of management’s assessment regarding the effectiveness of ICFR.  The impetus for this was the implementation of AS 5, which became effective in late 2007.

After initially reviewing audit firms’ implementation of AS 5 in 2008 and 2009, the PCAOB’s inspections began in 2010 to focus on inspecting for and reporting on whether firms obtained sufficient evidence to support their audit opinions on the effectiveness of ICFR.  Although somewhat unclear, we might gather from the above chart that the PCAOB’s scrutiny of audit firm compliance with AS 5 in 2010 may have re-focused the emphasis of audit firms on improving audit quality in 2011 (when compared to 2010).

Key areas of adverse auditor reports

Among those auditor reports with an adverse audit opinion on ICFR, the Audit Analytics report identifies the following internal controls issues with the highest frequency in 2015:

Ineffective ICFR issues

Total number of attestations

As % of total attestations citing ineffective ICFR
Material and/or numerous auditor and/or management adjustments

118

58%
Inadequate accounting personnel resources, competency, and/or training

105

52%
IT, software, security, and access controls

60

30%
Segregation of duties and/or design of controls

50

25%
Controls related to non-routine transactions

39

19%

As illustrated in the table above, the top reason for ineffective ICFR in 2015 was due to accounting issues which were known to materially misstate the financial statements.  Said differently, without recording the necessary adjustments, the financial statements taken as a whole would have been materially misstated.  The remaining top five reasons for ineffective ICFR in 2015 were due to internal controls issues (which either did or “could have” contributed to material errors in the financial statements).

Moreover, the Audit Analytics report lists the following accounting-related ICFR issues as most commonly cited in adverse audit reports in 2015:

Ineffective ICFR issues related to accounting

 Total number of attestations

As % of total attestations citing ineffective ICFR
Revenue recognition 47

23%
Income taxes

36

18%
A/R, notes receivable, investments, and cash

34

17%
Fixed assets and/or intangible assets

29

14%
Related parties and/or affiliates/subsidiaries

27

13%

Effectiveness of ICFR not requiring auditor attestation

In contrast to the requirements in Section 404(b) for accelerated filers, non-accelerated filers and smaller reporting companies need not comply with this provision, thanks to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, but they must comply with Section 404(a).  Furthermore, non-accelerated filers were not required to implement Section 404 until late 2007.

For clarification, a non-accelerated filer, as defined by SEC Rule 12b-2, is public company whose public float (as opposed to market capitalization) does not exceed $75 million as of the last business day of the company’s most recently completed fiscal Q2.  Furthermore, smaller reporting companies are those companies that meet the definition of a non-accelerated filer and had annual revenues of less than $50 million during the most recently completed fiscal year for which audited financial statements are available.

Having said that, the following chart shows the percentage of adverse management-only assessments relative to total management-only assessments on an annual basis in the last 12 years.

% Mgmt-Only Reports

Interestingly, this chart shows a negative trend over the years, with a drop in 2015.

Key areas of adverse management-only assessments

The Audit Analytics report identifies the following internal controls issues with the highest frequency in 2015 in management-only assessments:

Ineffective ICFR issues

 Total number of assessments

As % of total assessments citing ineffective ICFR
Inadequate accounting personnel resources, competency, and/or training

985

79%
Segregation of duties and/or design of controls

893

72%
Ineffective, non-existent, or understaffed audit committee

388

31%
Inadequate accounting disclosure controls

246

20%
Material and/or numerous auditor and/or management adjustments

204

16%

To note is that two of the five top ICFR issues in the table above are also among the top five ICFR issues in adverse auditor attestations.  A key reason for the provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act eliminating the requirement for non-accelerated filers and smaller reporting companies to comply with SOX Section 404(b) was due to cost of compliance.  Since we can see from the table above that overwhelmingly the two most common ICFR issues were inadequate accounting resources and segregation of duties/design of controls, it certainly seems reasonable to conclude that the cost of accounting resources is a relatively big factor for smaller public companies.  While understanding that these statistics describe ICFR issues for public companies, to my surprise is that the third most common issue deals with inadequacies of the audit committee.

With respect to accounting-related ICFR issues noted in management-only assessments, the Audit Analytics report lists the following most commonly cited in 2015:

Ineffective ICFR issues related to accounting

 Total number of assessments

As % of total assessments citing ineffective ICFR
A/R, notes receivable, investments, and cash

95

8%
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants and equity-related (beneficial conversion features)

53

4%
Income taxes

48

4%
Revenue recognition

38

3%
Related parties and/or affiliates/subsidiaries

24

2%

The above table demonstrates that the most frequently cited accounting-related issues in ICFR was similar between accelerated and non-accelerated filers and smaller reporting companies.  Furthermore, the Audit Analytics report indicates the top five accounting-related issues represented approximately two-thirds of the total accounting-related issues in 2015, both for adverse auditor reports and management-only assessments.

Summary

To put these findings into context for 2015, of those accelerated filers whose auditors issued an adverse SOX report, there was a pull toward ICFR failures due to accounting-related issues.  On the other hand, companies that issued management-only assessments citing ICFR failures experienced significantly higher rates of ICFR failures due to internal controls issues as opposed to accounting-related issues.

In addition, the ICFR failure rates reported by companies with management-only assessments were significantly higher than the ICFR failure rates reported by accelerated filers.  By applying a simple average over the last 12 years for accelerated filers and nine years for non-accelerated filers, the ICFR failure rates were 6.9% and 35.4%, respectively.

Finally, for additional context, I noted per review of the Audit Analytics report that in 2015 there were approximately 3,800 auditor attestations on SOX effectiveness filed with the SEC.  With regard to management-only assessments, there were approximately 3,500 management reports filed in 2015 with the SEC.  Therefore, the quantity of filings with the SEC between these two groups was comparable.

Source for charts:  Audit Analytics August 2016 report, SOX 404 Disclosures, a Twelve Year Review.

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Payout trends in the SEC’s whistleblower program

In July 2010, the U.S. Congress enacted and President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.   In connection with reform on investment protection, the Dodd-Frank Act provided for the establishment of a new whistleblower program.  The program provides for financial incentives for individuals to report potential federal securities laws violations to the SEC and provides for protection from employment retaliation.

Adoption of whistleblower rules

On May 25, 2011, the SEC adopted the new whistleblower rules, codified as Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, entitled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.”  Pursuant to these rules, the SEC has ability to provide monetary awards to eligible individuals who come forward with high-quality original information that leads to an SEC enforcement action in which over $1 million in sanctions is ordered.  The range for awards is between 10% and 30% of the money collected.

The rules clarify that “original information” must be:

(i) Derived from your independent knowledge or independent analysis;

(ii) Not already known to the Commission from any other source, unless you are the original source of the information;

(iii) Not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless you are a source of the information; and

(iv) Provided to the Commission for the first time after July 21, 2010 (the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act).  See Rule 21F-4(b)(1)

Furthermore, the rules state that information submitted to the SEC is provided “voluntarily” if:

…you provide your submission before a request, inquiry, or demand that relates to the subject matter of your submission is directed to you or anyone representing you (such as an attorney):

(i) By the Commission;

(ii) In connection with an investigation, inspection, or examination by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, or any self-regulatory organization; or

(iii) In connection with an investigation by the Congress, any other authority of the federal government, or a state Attorney General or securities regulatory authority.  See Rule 21F-4(a).

Discretionary payouts

As mentioned previously, the range of awards that the SEC will pay out is between 10% and 30% of the money collected, not of the monetary sanctions ordered.  With this in mind, the SEC considers the following factors to determine the size of the award:

  1. The significance of the information
  2. The assistance provided by the whistleblower
  3. Law enforcement interest that might be advanced by a higher award
  4. Whistleblower’s participation in internal compliance systems

In addition, the SEC considers the following factors to decrease the payout percentage of the award:

  1. Culpability
  2. An unreasonable reporting delay by the whistleblower
  3. Interference with internal compliance and reporting systems

SEC’s payout trends

From its inception through July 2016, the SEC’s whistleblower program has issued 24 final award orders and 51 final denial orders.  Of these 24 final award orders, the largest award amount disclosed was over $30 million (announced September 22, 2014) and the smallest award amount disclosed was $125 thousand (announced August 30, 2013).

Of the 19 disclosed award amounts, the median payout is approximately $700 thousand.

Furthermore, of the nine awards disclosing the payout as a percentage of the monetary sanctions collected, the SEC has ordered payouts of 30% on five occasions, a payout of 28% once, payouts of 20% twice, and one payout of 15%.  It should be noted that these figures represent the total payout percentages for each matter (regardless of the number of claimants).

Seven of the 24 final award orders mentioned more than one claimant for payout, with three of these awards naming two claimants and four naming three claimants.  The distribution of the payout to each of these claimants varied from equal proportion of the award among the claimants (33% or 50% to each claimant in final award orders naming three and two claimants, respectively) to as dispersed as 50% of the award to one claimant, 33% to another, and 17% to the third claimant within the same final award order.

Another interesting observation is that, of the 24 final award orders, the SEC disclosed the whistleblower profiles for 11 of them.  Of these 11 awards, two were in the compliance function, one was an officer, seven were non-descriptive insiders/employees, and one was an outsider.  There does not appear to be any correlation between the whistleblower profile and the payout percentage or amount of the award.

I have prepared a schedule that summarizes key information for each final award order.  This schedule includes all final orders through July 2016.

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Materiality in financial statements

All too often the concept of materiality in the context of financial statements is not black and white, as some like to think.  Over and over again my experience has been that materiality is commonly misunderstood and misapplied.  Those dealing with disputes who don’t have a solid understanding of materiality can find themselves fighting a tough uphill battle.

Definition

So, to begin, what is “materiality”?

When I was a financial statement auditor, my engagement team would compute a quantitative threshold and call it overall materiality.  This was typically 5% of the audit client’s pre-tax income from continuing operations for profit-oriented entities, or, if pre-tax income from continuing operations was volatile or perhaps a loss was realized in one year and a gain in another year, we would sometimes compute an alternative materiality, taking into account other financial statement metrics (such as revenues, assets, equity, etc.) and apply judgment in deciding on a quantitative threshold (SAS No. 107 at ¶ 4).  This overall materiality calculation was the starting point in planning the audit, assessing risk, and performing audit testing.  Although qualitative factors are considered in audits, the quantitative threshold is often the primary tool to measure the significance of misstatements.

However, in the context of a litigation, contractual dispute, or other matter, materiality is more broad than a simple quantitative threshold.  The SEC Staff elaborated (in 1999) on this concept of materiality in Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, Materiality, stating:

The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.

This formulation in the accounting literature is in substance identical to the formulation used by the courts in interpreting the federal securities laws. The Supreme Court has held that a fact is material if there is –

a substantial likelihood that the . . . fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.

Under the governing principles, an assessment of materiality requires that one views the facts in the context of the “surrounding circumstances,” as the accounting literature puts it, or the “total mix” of information, in the words of the Supreme Court. In the context of a misstatement of a financial statement item, while the “total mix” includes the size in numerical or percentage terms of the misstatement, it also includes the factual context in which the user of financial statements would view the financial statement item…

The FASB has long emphasized that materiality cannot be reduced to a numerical formula.

Rules of Thumb

The SEC Staff also weighed in on the common 5% threshold that many market participants applied in the past.  Although this SEC Staff guidance has been publicly known and relied upon for over 16 years, I still find this mentality:

The staff is aware that certain registrants, over time, have developed quantitative thresholds as “rules of thumb” to assist in the preparation of their financial statements, and that auditors also have used these thresholds in their evaluation of whether items might be considered material to users of a registrant’s financial statements. One rule of thumb in particular suggests that the misstatement or omission of an item that falls under a 5% threshold is not material in the absence of particularly egregious circumstances, such as self-dealing or misappropriation by senior management. The staff reminds registrants and the auditors of their financial statements that exclusive reliance on this or any percentage or numerical threshold has no basis in the accounting literature or the law.

The SEC also acknowledged widespread use of a 5% – 10% threshold range, which was referenced to FASB’s Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, at paragraph 167.

Deeper Understanding

There are some key phrases in SAB No. 99, namely “surrounding circumstances” and “total mix of information.”  I’d like to touch upon these key phrases next.

Although something may be perceived as immaterial on the surface, particularly quantitatively small misstatements, the following, at a minimum, should be considered:

  • whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of precise measurement or whether it arises from an estimate and, if so, the degree of imprecision inherent in the estimate
  • whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends
  • whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus expectations for the enterprise
  • whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa
  • whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant’s business that has been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant’s operations or profitability
  • whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with regulatory requirements
  • whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with loan covenants or other contractual requirements
  • whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s compensation – for example, by satisfying requirements for the award of bonuses or other forms of incentive compensation
  • whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful transaction.

The Staff made sure that users of this guidance understood that this above list “is not an exhaustive list…”  All relevant facts and circumstances should be considered.  By the way, I want to mention that a key criticism of SAB No. 99 is that it does not clearly define what is not considered to be material.  This “gap,” of course, can be an area of frustration for registrants.

Applicability

Another thing I want to make clear is that all of this talk about materiality is, unless specific contractual terms dictate otherwise, in the context of “the financial statements taken as a whole.”  Further, the same context applies to auditors when they plan and perform audits (SAS No. 107 at ¶ 7 and 11d).  For those who like to refer to the “old school” auditing standards, SAS No. 47, which was superseded by SAS No. 107, has similar language (see ¶ 3, 8).

Recently I assisted an expert take a firm, reliable position that materiality must be considered in the context of the financial statements taken as a whole and not on a subset of a subset of the financial statements.   The litigation I refer to involved allegations that the defendant client materially misstated its financial statements such that one of its primary users relied on allegedly materially misstated information.  Having a strong grasp of materiality and how to assess specific transactions, disclosures, or business segments for materiality is a game changer for clients involved in disputes or investigations.  Attorneys should seek out practitioners that have a solid understanding of these materiality concepts.

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